This paper sets out the key possible controls for preventing or managing AI. It sets out whether the control can apply to HPAI only, all AI, or even when there is no confirmed AI and the circumstances in which the control is legally required or in which it could only be put in place voluntarily.
The material will help the Department determine its response in different situations but it is not intended to be definitive as specific circumstances for action cannot always be pre-determined.
- - - ISOLATION OF POULTRY - - -
Description and purpose of measure
Ensuring as far as possible that farmed birds and wild birds cannot mix. For intensively reared birds, that may mean only extra steps to prevent entry by wild birds. For free range and organics systems, it will mean housing birds or closely fencing them in (above as well as at ground level). This is a particular issue for broilers whose sheds are less likely to be able to sustain long term housing of stock. This step might be appropriate even when there is no confirmed disease, but only if the risk of disease coming into the country is assessed as (significantly) higher than usual.
Legality
-- Required on suspect and infected premises.
-- Required under the Diseases of Poultry Order (DOP) in a Protection Zone (PZ) but not a Surveillance Zone (SZ) during an outbreak of avian influenza (AI).
-- Possibility of extending isolation measures to the SZ in the new DOP or Declaratory Orders made under the Animal Health Act (AHA).
-- Possibility of discretionary powers to declare zones on outbreak of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) in the new DOP;
-- No power in AHA or DOP to require keepers to isolate poultry in absence of suspicion.
-- Possible scope for taking precautionary measures (including isolation) under the Veterinary Checks Directive where there is suspicion. Any measures would need to be proportionate.
-- If measure required by Government, free range status can be retained for eggs produced and for broilers if they spend the majority of their life outside of the house.
-- The new draft Diseases of Poultry Order introduces powers to declare control zones, which could include isolation of poultry in an outbreak.
Practicality
-- Farms may not be geared up for this. However, they will need to make plans to do so as they may be required to by law during an outbreak.
-- Veterinary advice will need to inform what isolation means in practice.
-- How long would this control be in place in any one area? There could be welfare issues.
Proportionality
-- This measure was not taken in the UK during the 2003 Dutch outbreak.
-- There may be potential costs for broiler producers in particular.
-- If it were adopted, in what areas would we wish to see this measure used - migratory flyways, areas around found incidences of LPAI, the entire country?
Exit conditions
-- This measure is a temporary measure. It would be difficult to introduce in response to finding LPAI in wild birds as there is a continual risk of LPAI being present in wildfowl.
- - - SURVEILLANCE AND SAMPLING OF POULTRY - - -
Description and purpose of measure
Entering property and taking samples for testing to ascertain the presence of AI virus. This could be a step adopted both as a precaution and as a key element of control during an outbreak. There is an annual survey for LPAI in poultry.
Legality - Slaughter
-- Required under the AHA for premises where either HPAI or LPAI is suspected.
-- Additional powers under the AHA to enter premises to ascertain whether disease anti-bodies exist or whether any causative agent of disease is on the premises.
-- Powers to do so anywhere in a PZ (i.e. where disease confirmed in poultry)
-- Annual LPAI survey effectively voluntary, to date.
-- If we find LPAI or HPAI we have the power to cull, dispose of birds, require disinfection before restocking, etc.. We can require firebreak cull, in extremis.
Legality - Compensation
-- If we find LPAI or HPAI, we have a duty to pay compensation - but not for diseased birds. Any other payments would be ex gratia, though policy currently is not to compensate for consequential losses.
-- Cannot claim back from EU any costs associated with controlling LPAI.
Practicality
-- No significant practical obstacles where there are powers of entry.
-- Producers might refuse to be sampled if we do not have powers to require sampling.
-- Only other constraints could be laboratory capacity or finance.
Proportionality
-- It would seem a valid response to any threat to proceed with and consider heightening sampling. Would we need to conduct a larger LPAI survey or do it in more different periods of the year?
Exit conditions
-- It ought to be possible to define conditions in which sampling would be reduced, but as this information would be part of the assessment of what other measures needed to be in place, it might need to be in place for a long time, perhaps years.
- - - SURVEILLANCE AND SAMPLING OF WILD BIRDS - - -
Description and purpose of measure
Sampling of wild birds, particularly ducks and geese for the presence of the AI virus. This is most likely to detect pockets of LPAI in migratory birds. If H5 or H7 strains were discovered we would be forewarned about the possibility of transmission into domesticated birds and mutation into high pathogenic a strain. This is a measure for both peacetime and during an outbreak.
Legality
-- General powers in the Animal Health Act allow entry on to land to deal with wild birds and survey, thus can enter land to test wildfowl for LPAI/HPAI if suspected to harbour disease.
-- Duty to cooperate with inspectors.
-- No duty to confirm disease if we find HPAI in wild birds.
-- No duty under Directive to declare disease if we find LPAI.
-- We only need to inform the EU and the OIE when we have HPAI. Nevertheless, we would make public any information on incidents of LPAI found during a survey.
-- The AHA provides for destruction of wild birds. Limits on the use of this power include need to show spread to other birds and need to consult with the Nature Conservancy Council.
Practicality
-- Die-offs already investigated by arrangements between wildlife trusts etc and Defra/VLA.
-- Need cooperation from farmers/landowners if want to extend the range of surveillance/sampling.
-- Laboratory capacity and finance may be constrained.
-- Need clear guidance to volunteers on health protection.
Proportionality
-- Valid response to heightened fear of AI.
-- Whole year or just inward migratory seasons?
-- Strategy being agreed with EU partners and should ensure that greatest assurance gained from coordination of effort.
-- If we have to declare disease if we find it, we need to ensure action is proportionate to the risk and take account of any implications for trade.
Exit conditions
-- It ought to be possible to define conditions in which sampling would be reduced, but as this information would be part of the assessment of what other measures needed to be in place, it might need to be in place for a long time, perhaps years.
- - - BAN FAIRS, MARKETS, SHOWS - - -
Description and purpose of measure
Banning gatherings of poultry. A key transmission route is through faecal contamination of vehicles, clothing or equipment, or by birds being exposed to virus in faeces. Gatherings of animals or their keepers present the risk of wide transmission from a single point of infection. It may not be appropriate to put this measure in place unless there was confirmed disease.
Legality
-- Such gatherings are banned in the PZ and SZ during an AI outbreak in poultry.
-- Possibility of applying PZ and SZ restrictions where there is an outbreak in captive birds or racing pigeons constituting a serious risk to poultry.
-- Possibility of justifying additional measures under the Veterinary Checks Directive.
-- New draft DOP provides for control zones - possibility of banning gatherings in such zones.
-- We could decide to have a much larger SZ than the 10km. Such restrictions may be deemed disproportionate.
-- We would try to encourage voluntary cancelling of fairs, markets and shows.
Practicality
-- This control is simple to put in place.
-- It is one which the industry may volunteer in certain circumstances or where a Government request would meet with strong compliance.
-- Racing pigeons are a risk factor, which needs to be factored in, as they mix with wild birds.
Proportionality
-- There would be few costs or other lasting implications involved in this measure.
-- Appropriate if there was disease in poultry or captive birds in the country.
Exit conditions
-- The measure could be withdrawn at around the time any HPAI outbreak were ending, on veterinary advice/risk assessment.
-- Once in place, it may not be so simple to withdraw if LPAI had been the trigger for the control and it was still being found in wild birds.
- - - CONTROL MOVEMENTS OF POULTRY - - -
Description and purpose of measure
Preventing movements of poultry off or onto premises, except under licence. This manages the risk of infected birds - or those suspected to be so - moving to other farms or elsewhere and spreading infection. This control is most appropriate on premises where disease is suspected or nationally in the case of an outbreak in farmed birds. Its value in managing the potential for wild birds to be infected is less clear.
Legality
-- Required control under Directive in PZs and SZs, during an HPAI outbreak, and on suspect premises.
-- The new draft DOP would include the power to declare control zones and to impose a national movement ban if deemed appropriate in the light of risk assessment. We would need to show this was a proportionate response.
-- The Veterinary Checks Directive could be relied on providing measure is proportionate and the Commission approve.
Practicality
-- Relatively simple to put in place.
-- Can cause significant difficulties to parts of the industry, particularly hatcheries, but SVS would have the power to licence off moves or move equipment on.
-- Welfare problems could be exacerbated where farmers have no contingency plan in place. Poultry keepers are responsible for the welfare of their birds during disease outbreaks and their consequences
-- Birds that have been accustomed to free range but are then housed 24 hours a day for a period of time may face welfare problems such as behavioural problems such as cannibalism and feather pecking.
-- Restriction on the movement of both laying hens and broiler chickens could have an adverse welfare impact not only on the birds directly concerned but on the whole chain of production
-- Repercussions outside the restricted area when rearers and hatchery owners find difficulty in placing surplus birds are likely.
-- For laying hens movement restrictions on adult birds could result in birds being kept beyond the normal laying period, which may lead to behavioural problems.
-- There would be implications for hatcheries who would be unable to place newly hatched chicks. A similar scenario could be seen in the broiler industry, although welfare problems may be more severe where broilers are retained beyond their normal slaughter weight
Proportionality
-- Proportional response on premises where H5 or H7 virus is found.
-- Not something that can be requested of industry in other circumstances?
Exit conditions
-- As set out in the DOP.
- - - CONTROL MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE, MACHINERY ETC. - - -
Description and purpose of measure
A key method of transmitting virus is mechanically through contact with faeces. Controlling the movement of people, machinery and the like is central to controlling a disease outbreak. The measure seems most appropriate where there is direct suspicion of disease or known disease in the vicinity.
Legality
-- Required control under Directive in PZs and SZs, during an HPAI outbreak, and on suspect premises.
-- New draft DOP contains power to declare control zones. Possibility of extending movement controls. Would need to show proportionate response.
Practicality
-- Relatively simple to put in place.
-- Can cause significant difficulties to parts of the industry, particularly hatcheries, but SVS would have the power to licence off moves.
Proportionality
-- Proportional response on premises where H5 or H7 virus is found.
-- Something that may be difficult to request of industry in other circumstances.
Exit conditions
-- As set out in the DOP.
- - - CONTROL REMOVAL OF MANURE - - -
Description and purpose of measure
Poultry litter or poultry manure shall not be spread. This measure controls the storage, transport and disposal of the prime mechanism (faeces) through which disease is spread. It is designed to prevent further spread to either wild or farmed birds. It does not seem appropriate unless there is direct suspicion of disease or known disease in the vicinity.
Legality
-- On a suspected or infected premises no person shall remove from the premises or spread in the premises any used poultry litter or poultry manure.
-- In a Protection Zone used litter and poultry manure should not be removed or spread.
-- In the Surveillance Zone used litter and poultry manure are not moved out of the zone.
-- New draft DOP provides for declaration of control zones. Possibility of imposing restrictions re litter and manure in such zones. Needs to be proportionate response.
Practicality
-- Direct contact with secretions from infected birds, especially faeces is a major cause of the spread of Avian influenza, thus important that no litter or poultry manure is removed.
-- On an infected premises used litter and manure must be treated by a method capable of killing the virus, as approved by a veterinary inspector.
Proportionality
-- It would seem a valid response to any threat of spreading disease.
-- Consideration is currently being given to the further development of future movement licensing during an avian disease outbreak.
Exit conditions
-- Movement restrictions can be removed once the zones are lifted.
- - - CONTROL REMOVAL OF EGGS - - -
Description and purpose of measure
Restrictions are put into place to restrict the removal of hatching eggs to prevent the spread of disease. This protects against the threat of mechanical transfer of virus and the spread of virus through breeding. It would have a great and very quick effect on the industry and is only justified in cases of confirmed disease.
Legality
-- On a suspected or infected premises no person shall move any eggs from premises.
-- In a Protection Zone hatching eggs are not moved from the premises except under a licence issued by a veterinary inspector. In the case of hatching eggs to a designated hatchery, subject to the eggs and their packing being disinfected before dispatch.
-- In the Surveillance Zone hatching eggs are not moved from the premises out of the zone except under a licence issued by a veterinary inspector for the purpose of transport direct to a designated hatchery and subject to the eggs and their packing being disinfected before dispatch.
Practicality
-- No movements of eggs without a licence, from Protection and Surveillance Zones.
-- Licences can be applied for via the Local Animal Health Office
-- A veterinary risk assessment will take place to ascertain whether movements which are prohibited may be licensed
Proportionality
-- It would seem a valid response to any threat of spreading disease.
-- The fact that we can allow licensed movements, subject to veterinary risk assessment ensures that this is proportional.
-- Consideration is currently being given to the further development of future movement licensing during an avian disease outbreak.
Exit conditions
-- All egg movement restrictions can be removed once the zones are lifted.
- - - DISINFECTION AT ENTRANCES AND EXITS - - -
Description and purpose of measure
The occupier of the premises shall provide and maintain an appropriate means of disinfection at the entrances and exits of the buildings housing poultry and of the premises. This is good practice in any event and could be adopted voluntarily by the industry as a matter of course. Government encouragement or requirement of this step would be appropriate in circumstances of heightened suspicion or threat.
Legality
-- Measure is required under the Directive in PZs and on suspect premises during an outbreak of HPAI.
-- New draft DOP provides for declaration of control zones. Possibility of imposing additional C&D restrictions in such zones if this is proportionate.
-- The disinfectants approved for use under the Diseases of Poultry (England) Order 2003 are set out in the schedules to the Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectants) Order 1978.
Practicality
-- This simple measure involves a footbath, disinfectant and a brush, but provides valuable biosecurity.
Proportionality
-- This measure is only required where disease is suspected or confirmed.
-- Could form part of a farm's FHP or other voluntary biosecurity arrangements.
-- In proportion to the situation helping to reduce the potential for carrying disease on to or off the premises.
Exit conditions
-- The requirement is necessary in an outbreak of HPAI until the premises is declared free from disease.
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